ABSTRACT Meter data collection and management in smart grid has the potential for underlying security risks, e.g., low-sparsity unobservable attacks. Thus, it is crucial to investigate the vulnerability of smart grid through various exposure tests associated with these unobservable attacks. Recently, much attention has been paid to low-sparsity unobservable attacks with complete knowledge of the system matrix. In this paper, the unobservable attack exposure analysis is based on a relaxed condition, i.e., an incomplete knowledge of the system matrix. Furthermore, a data-driven attack scheme is designed to demonstrate that such knowledge can be learned with a two-stage strategy. In the first stage, a sequence of intercepted meter data is utilized to learn about the incomplete system matrix with a blind identification approach. In the second stage, the estimated system matrix at hand is used for the attack vector construction with a sparsity-exploiting method. Finally, the validity of the proposed data-driven attack scheme is tested through various experiments. The proposed result reveals the potential risk of meter data leakage to the security of the smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an intelligent power delivery system, the smart grid can automatically perform numerous meter data collections, complete analyses for system monitoring and control. The datadriven control and management of the smart grid requires a timely update of the system information, which leads to realtime data exchange between the meters and system operators. Generally, the data are first collected from the remote smart meters, and then transmitted to the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system for the system state estimation, and facilitation of stable operations and system control. However, most of the meters are unprotected and can be easily attacked, which results in data interception and contamination of the smart grid. Hence, the power flow data related security issue [1] - [3] has become a hot spot in security research of the smart grid. Recent studies have focused on designing various attack exposure tests to find the vulnerabilities of the smart grid and also to enhance its safety.
One type of cyber-attack is the false data injection, which can be launched against the state estimation without being observed [4] - [7] . A new method of false data injection, called a low-sparsity unobservable attack, is proposed to tamper with a modest number of meter measurements under sparse terms. This malicious attack can bypass traditional detectors, e.g., Bad Data Detection (BDD) [8] as shown by residual testing. More importantly, the attack can mislead the SCADA system into the wrong operation and further damage the users' benefits [9] . Thus, it is necessary to investigate lowsparsity unobservable attacks, the result of which could significantly improve the security of the smart grid.
Several studies focus mainly on unobservable attacks (including low-sparsity attacks) with the complete knowledge of the system matrix. The information of the system matrix includes topology knowledge and physical parameters of the smart grid. Rahman et al. investigate the possibilities of performing a successful unobservable attack with an inaccurate version of the system matrix [10] . The vulnerability of the smart grid is evaluated by the security indices, which can help system operators identify vulnerable meters in the power system and consequently provide protective measures [11] , [12] . Zhao et al. provide the fundamental limit of cyber-physical security in the presence of low-sparsity unobservable attacks [13] . It is shown in [14] and [15] that the complete system matrix can be identified using an independent component analysis method. Nevertheless, such attack schemes might not be easy to implement, as all meter data are required to be known and all the meters are required to be controlled. On the other hand, several detection and defence schemes are provided based on the complete knowledge of the system matrix. The off-line method, based on the Kullback-Leibler distance, is proposed to track malicious attacks using historical data [16] . It should be noted that this method may not work very well for continuous small-scale attacks. Li et al. consider the problem for the online detection of malicious attacks to be a sequence of detectors based on the generalized likelihood ratio [17] . Furthermore, [18] develops two distinctive methods to detect unobservable attacks, assuming that the system states are almost steady between successive time periods. However, this assumption might not be held during electricity peak times.
It is reported that unobservable attacks can be designed with incomplete knowledge of the system matrix. New malicious cyber-attacks, namely, load redistribution attacks, are investigated in [19] to quantitatively analyse the damage of such attacks to the smart grid. Liu et al. model a local load redistribution attack by determining the optimal attack region based on reduced network information [20] . Giani et al. utilize the sparse topology information of the smart grid to determine the attack meter sets [21] . However, these works lack the discussion of the system matrix acquisition. In fact, the design of the attack vector relies heavily on precise knowledge of the system matrix. Usually, the smart grid is treated as a complex network with enormous electrical devices and long-distance transmission lines. Such complexity, including the topology connections of the devices and the branch physical parameters, are reflected from the parameters of the system matrix. This information is so crucial for the system operation that it is measured and strongly protected by the SCADA system. In this case, it would not be easy to obtain such confidential information for an attacker who has limited access to the smart grid. Overall, a feasible unobservable attack scheme based on the incomplete system matrix has not yet been fully investigated.
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive study on the feasibility of low-sparsity attacks against the smart grid with an incomplete knowledge of the system matrix. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We theoretically prove that low-sparsity unobservable attacks can be executed with relaxed implementation conditions. Different to the existing works, the provided conditions are developed based on the topology information as well as the physical parameters of the system matrix.
• We illustrate low-sparsity unobservable attacks by designing a data-driven attack scheme, which includes a system matrix estimation stage and an attack vector construction stage.
• We demonstrate that the meter data leakage is as risky as manipulation of the meters through various attack exposure experiments. This new finding provides a new perspective to discuss the security of the smart grid from the meter data leakage aspect.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The problem statement is presented in Section II. The attack exposure analysis with an incomplete knowledge of the system matrix is investigated in Section III. A data-driven attack scheme is illustrated in Section IV. Experimental results and analyses are given in Section V. The conclusions are provided in Section VI. Some mathematical notations used are as follows:
Notations:
Complementary set |S| Number of elements in set S a Attack vector I n Identity matrix of size n × n H System matrix H(S, :) Submatrix of H with rows indexed by S (·) T Transpose (·) −1 Inverse of matrix
Covariance operation rank(·) Rank of matrix diag(·) Stacking of the diagonal elements of the involved matrix into a vector cum(·) The moments of the distribution
II. PROBLEM STATEMENTS A. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the smart grid as a simplified lossless Direct Current (DC) load flow model [1] , [2] , which contains three parts: buses, branch lines, and loads. We assume that the DC load flow model contains n + 1 buses equipped with meters that are connected by branch lines, and there are m branch lines metered in this model. Let θ = θ 1 . . . θ n T denote the state variables involving the unknown bus voltage magnitudes or bus voltage phase angles. Let f n + 1 + m be defined as the total meter indices including n + 1 buses and m branch lines. The DC load flow model can be described as a linear 8184 VOLUME 5, 2017 matrix form [1] , such that
where z = z 1 . . . z f T is the meter measurements, H ∈ R f ×n is the system matrix, and e = e 1 . . . e f T is the independent Gaussian noise with a zero mean and a known covariance σ 2 e I f . Specifically, the system matrix in (1) can be further defined by
where B T b 1 . . . b n+1 ∈ R m×(n+1) is the incidence matrix. As the network of DC model is a sparse system in which each bus is connected to at most a few other buses, each b i of B T is a sparse vector where only a few components are non-zeros, e.g.,
properties of the DC network are described by a non-singular diagonal matrix D ∈ R m×m , where diag(
and each d i refers to the reciprocal of the reactance of the branch lines. The identity matrix P ∈ R (n+1)×n truncates n columns from the identity matrix I n+1 , such as P I n 0 1×n .
Together, H is the system matrix, and it is related to the topology information and physical parameters of the smart grid.
The system model of (1) is based on the following assumptions. A1) The system matrix H is treated as static over a period of time; H is a column-wise independent matrix such that rank(H) = n and each column of H has non-zero entries. A2) The standard DC load flow model has a quasi-steady state operation. The transmission lines are lossless and all bus voltages are 1 per-unit (p.u.). The entries of θ are statistically dependent and the power angle difference θ i − θ j is small. A3) The prior knowledge of the system matrix H is unknown to an attacker. Assumption A1) refers to the conditions of the system matrix [12] . The full column rank assumption of the system matrix ensures the observability of the DC power flow system. Assumption A2) provides the statistical conditions of the state variables. This assumption guarantees the system states can be detected from the meter measurements. Note that the smart grid is a complex network with enormous electrical devices, such as generators, synchronous condensers, loads and power flow meters. Moreover, the smart grid is a distributed network with long-distance transmission lines. Such complexity are reflected from the parameters of the system matrix. Regarding the importance of the knowledge of system matrix, this information is protected strongly by the SCADA system [14] , [22] . Based on the above considerations, assumption A3) introduces a general attack scenario with an attacker who has limited access to the system matrix information of the smart grid.
B. UNOBSERVABLE ATTACKS
To monitor and maintain the power flow of the smart grid, real-time meter data are collected and transmitted via the communication networks to the SCADA for system state estimation. The state estimation problem based on the DC power flow model can be transformed into the least squares minimization problem, such as
This optimization problem (3) can be solved by the weighted least squares approach [23] . Letθ denote the estimated system state vector, then the residuals between the measurements and the estimate values due to the faulty sensors or topological errors is given by
where r = r 1 . . . r f T . The detection of faulty data in the measurements can be completed by processing the calculated residuals r. Usually, hypothesis testing based on the largest normalized residual, called the Bad Data Detection (BDD) [8] method, is used to identify the measurements contaminated by faulty data. However, recent works show that a new malicious attack, namely, an unobservable attack, can bypass the BDD method without being observed by the system operator.
The unobservable attack is defined as follows [4] : 
where all components of a are non-zeros, and δ ∈ R n is the associated perceived change of the system state variables θ.
If the attack vector a is injected into the power flow system, the contaminated measurements can be rewritten as
Correspondingly, the residuals between the measurements and the estimated values of (6) are given by
Since there is no difference between r a and r, the unobservable attacks can trick the system operator into believing that the true state isθ a =θ + δ instead ofθ . Thus, the injection attack cannot be observed by the system operator.
C. LOW-SPARSITY UNOBSERVABLE ATTACKS
Definition 1 shows that the unobservable attack does not depend on the current system state, but relies on the system matrix. In fact, such a definition implicitly includes two conditions: the complete knowledge of the system matrix must be known, and all the meters in the smart grid must be compromised. These conditions restrict the implementation of a malicious attack. Furthermore, an unobservable attack with low-sparsity is proposed to perform the malicious attack.
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A strictly mathematical definition and a theorem of the lowsparsity unobservable attack are provided as follows [21] : Definition 2: An attack A = (S, a) contains an attack meter set S, and an attack vector a. The nonzero components of a corresponds to the attack meters in S, i.e., a i = 0 ⇔ i ∈ S. The number of set S is |S| = k, which indicates the sparsity of the attack A, i.e., a 0 = k. Let M denote the set of all meters, indexed by {1, 2, . . . , f }. Moreover, let V = M \ S denote the complement of S. Assuming the rows of H can be permuted without a loss of generality, an attack is unobservable with low-sparsity when the attack vector satisfies the following:
where L H(S, :) and K H(V, :), respectively. Theorem 3: An attack denoted by A = (S, a) is unobservable with low-sparsity when the following conditions are satisfied:
b) the attack vector a must belong to the following subspace:
where δ = 0. Definition 2 presents two key components of a low-sparsity unobservable attack: the attack meter set and the sparse attack vector. Theorem 3 provides algebraic conditions to determine a low-sparsity unobservable attack. These results show that the attack vector should be calculated based on the complete knowledge of the system matrix. However, this condition is still difficult to satisfy as such knowledge is strongly protected by the SCADA system. Thus, the conditions of performing a low-sparsity unobservable attack must be further relaxed. In the following section, we try to provide an attack exposure analysis for the low-sparsity unobservable attacks using an incomplete knowledge of the system matrix.
III. ATTACK EXPOSURE ANALYSIS WITH AN INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SYSTEM MATRIX A. PROPOSED ATTACK CONDITIONS
First, a method is provided to determine the attack meter set. Let T and U denote as the set of all bus meters and the set of all branch meters, indexed by {1, . . . , n + 1} and {n + 2, . . . , f }, respectively. Here, {T, U} = M. Every attack meter set S i = {T i , U i } with i = 1, . . . , n + 1, where T i and U i refer to the set of neighbouring bus meters of the ith bus meter (including itself) and the set of branch meters connecting between the i-th bus meter and its neighbouring bus meters, respectively. Regarding the sparse topology of the power system, the number of attack meter sets satisfies:
It is worth noting that the attack meter set S i relies only on the local tree topology of the power system. As an example, Fig.1 illustrates the attack meter set with various sparsity level. Fig.1 (a) shows a 3-sparse attack meter set including 1 bus meter root (the i-th bus), 1 bus meter node and 1 branch meter. Fig.1 (b) shows a 5-sparse attack meter set including 1 bus meter root (the i-th bus), 2 bus meter nodes and 2 branch meters.
Next, a method is provided to construct attack vector corresponds to the attack meter set S i . Let the perceived change of the system state variables be defined as
where ϕ i is a non-zero element. The corresponding attack vector denoted by a i is given by
As will be shown in the following Theorem 4, the sparsity of the proposed attack vector in terms of (9) satisfies:
Moreover, the non-zero entries of a i relies on only the knowledge of the system sub-matrix H(S i , :).
B. ATTACK EXPOSURE ANALYSIS
By applying the provided attack meter set S i and the attack vector a i , we have developed the following theorem: Proof: First, we show that the proposed attack A i = (S i , a i ) is a low-sparsity unobservable attack. Applying (2), each element denoted by h j,i of the sub-matrix H 1 is defined by
where ± indicates the power flow is from or to the ith bus, and r indicates the branch index connected to the ith bus and the jth bus. Similarly, each element denoted by h t,i of the submatrix H 2 is defined by
Note that S i = {T i , U i } and V i = {T\T i , U\U i }. We define L i H(S i , :) and K i H(V i , :). We let l i and k i denote the ith column of matrices L i and K i , respectively. After applying (10) and (11), we have
By applying (12b), it follows that
Furthermore, the proposed attack vector in (9) can be rewritten as
Hence, the proposed attack vector a i belongs to the subspace:
Note that the provided (13) and (15) satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3; thus, the proposed attack A i = (S i , a i ) is unobservable with low-sparsity. Next, we show that every attack A i = (S i , a i ) is irreducible. We define the subset of S i and V i asS i andṼ i = M \S i , respectively. Note thatS i S i and V i Ṽ i ; thus, S i ∩Ṽ i = φ. It follows that each column ofK i H(Ṽ i , :) is not a non-zero vector and rank(K i ) = n. Applying the conditions of Theorem 3, we know thatÃ i = (S i ,ã i ) is not an unobservable attack with low-sparsity.
Theorem 4 guarantees the proposed attack is unobservable with low-sparsity. In addition, the proposed attack is irreducible, that is, a minimal attack meter set is required in a unobservable attack. This theoretically proves that the lowsparsity unobservable attack can be performed based on the provided attack meter set S i and the incomplete system matrix H(S i , :). In practise, the knowledge of H(S i , :) is usually unknown and protected by the system operator. In the following section, we try to provide a data-driven attack scheme to show that the incomplete system matrix can be learned and utilized to implement a low-sparsity unobservable attack.
IV. PROPOSED DATA-DRIVEN ATTACK SCHEME A. OVERVIEW As shown in the work of [24] , the interception from the unprotected meters are applicable during the transmission of meter data. In this case, the intercepted data are assumed to be utilized in the design of a low-sparsity unobservable attack. Based on this consideration, a data-driven attack scheme with two-stage strategy is concluded as follows: 1) At the first stage, a blind identification method is employed to identify the incomplete system matrix along with the reduced meter data. A model transformation is necessary to ensure the identifiability of the system matrix. 2) At the second stage, a constraint cardinality minimization model is built to construct the sparse attack vector along with obtained knowledge of the system matrix. A developed non-linear relaxation method is provided to ensure the construction of the attack vector.
B. FIRST STAGE OF THE PROPOSED ATTACK SCHEME
It is worth to noting that the system model (1) is not a linearly independent system due to the high statistical correlation of the entries of θ . Thus, the blind identification method cannot be straightforwardly employed based on the system model (1). Similar to the work of [14] , the system model (1) firstly can be transformed into a linearly independent system based on the load variables. Let x = x 1 . . . x n d T denote the system load variables, where n d is the loads number (n d < n).
Since the system state variables θ are inter-correlated to the system load variables x, this relation can be described as a nonlinear function θ = f(x). Without loss of generality, the entries of x are statistically independent, and f(0) = 0. We can approximate have
where the Jacobian matrix T refers to the first-order coefficient matrix of the Taylor expansion of f(x) at 0, and o( x 2 F ) is the remainder term. In general, the error term o( x 2 F ) can be negligible if the load variations are sufficiently small, e.g., the loads at off-peak electricity times. Correspondingly, the system model (1) is equivalent to
where G = g 1 . . . g n d HT ∈ R f ×n d refers to a new system matrix. (17) is a linear independent system model due to the independence of the individual load variables x.
As mentioned in the theorem 4, the unknown information of the sub-system matrix H(S i , :) is required to identify with the intercepted meter data. Based on the new system model (17) , the estimation problem is essentially equivalent to identify the system sub-matrix G(S i , :) H(S i , :)T. To simplify the following notations, the complete system matrix G instead of G(S i , :) is addressed in the following proposed attack scheme. And a necessary explanation will be included at the end of this section for completeness. Specifically, a multi-way decomposition method, such as the PARallel FACtor analysis (PARAFAC) [25] , [26] , can be employed to infer the latent system matrix with the intercepted meter data. Here, a sequence of meter data with N samples is assumed to be intercepted. Such data are calculated as a high-order cumulant, e.g., a fourth-order tensor,
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where κ j > 0 is the kurtosis of the j-th load variable, i.e., κ j = cum(x j , x j , x j , x j ). In [27] , it is stated that the decomposition of a sum of rank-1 terms as in (19) is generically unique if
Based on this condition, we can infer the minimal intercepted measurements f min when the load number n d is given, which is provided in Table 1 .
In general, the decomposition of (19) can be formulated as a constraint minimization problem, e.g.,
Due to the multi-linearity of the optimization problem (20), a commonly used approach, namely, the alternative least squares method [25] can be employed to find the optimal solution. LetĜ denote the estimated system matrix of G from the solution of (20) . These matrices are linked in theory as follows:
where is the permutation matrix, and is the diagonal matrix. As shown in the work of [14] , these trivial indeterminacies have no impact on the system matrix identification.
C. SECOND STAGE OF THE PROPOSED ATTACK SCHEME
In this section, our objective is to construct the attack vector of the a i corresponding to the attack meter set S i based on the estimated matrixĜ. Based on the new model of (17), the attack vector in terms of (9) can be rewritten as
where y ∈ R n d refers to the perceived change of the load variables. Note that y should be well calculated to ensure the sparsity of the designed attack vector. Based on the above considerations, we show that the construction problem of a i can be transformed into a constraint minimization optimization model. Here, we provide some notations to simplify the following discussion. We denote w (Ĝ(i, :)) T , and
M\{i}. With a necessary reordering of the rows, such that a i can be rewritten as
In (23), we restrict w T y = 1. This restriction indicates that the i-th bus meter is fixed, that is, the attack meter set corresponds to S i . Based on the definitions of (22) and (23) 
Note that the optimization (24) is a Non-deterministic Polynomial-time-hard (NP) problem, an alternative method, such that the p (0 < p < 1) relaxation technique [28] , [29] can be employed to find the solution of (24) . In this case, the optimization model (24) can be rewritten as
As shown in Appendix A, the solution of (25) can be iteratively calculated from
where ε is a positive regularized parameter, e.g., ε = 10 −8 , and
When the optimal solution denoted by y * is obtained by applying (26) , the attack vector can be calculated with (22) . The convergence issue of the developed p relaxation method has been discussed in [30] , and included here for completeness. Theorem 5: For 0 < p < 1, assuming 1) y = 0 and 2) Q i is a column-wise linearly independent matrix, the iterative sequences {y (iter) } +∞ iter=0 obtained by (26) are convergent. The proposed two-stage attack scheme is summarized in Algorithm 1. Note that the sparsity of the attack vector, it is not necessary to obtain the complete information of the system matrix in the proposed attack scheme. In this case, a sub-system matrix G(E i , :) is required to estimate, where E i refers to the intercepted meter set satisfying S i E i and |E i | < f . The number of |E i | can be selected as relatively large than the number of loads. Correspondingly, a reduced data set Z(E i , :) is supposed to be intercepted. Moreover, the constructed sparse attack vector with a reordering procedure should be reformulated as
where
where N is the length of meter data. Stage 1: Estimate the system matrixĜ along with the fourth-order cumulant of the meter data Z by applying (18) . Define the matrix Q i Ĝ (N i , :). Stage 2: Set the relaxation parameter p, pre-attack bus meter i, and the iterative step iter = 1; Randomize y (0) and calculate y (1) by applying (26) . while y (iter) − y (iter−1) 2 F ≥ ε, (e.g., ε = 10 −5 ) do Update y (iter+1) by applying (26) ; iter = iter + 1; end while Output: y * . Calculate a * i along with y * by applying (22) . False data injection: z a * i = z + a * i .
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. SETTINGS
In this section, the performance of the proposed attack scheme is evaluated through experiments using IEEE test system [31] , e.g., the IEEE 14-bus system and the IEEE 30-bus system. Fig.2 (a) shows the topology of the IEEE 14-bus system, which contains 3 generators, 14 buses and 11 loads. Fig.2 (b) shows the topology of the IEEE 30-bus system, which contains 5 generators, 30 buses and 20 loads. The state estimation can be performed using the meter data generated by MATPOWER [32] , which is a package of Matlab M-files. According to the consensus in [33] , all the branch lines and buses are required to be metered in our experiments. Moreover, the loads are randomly changed to generate analogue data to reflect a realistic power flow environment. The meter data are generated by requiring the load variables to be uniformly distributed among 50% and 150% of the base load variables [18] , where the data length N is selected as 8000. Next, the criteria of the Signal-to-Noise Ratios (SNRs) between the estimated meter data and noise are defined as follows:
B. EXPERIMENTS
As shown in Fig.2 , the proposed data-driven attack scheme is evaluated under common low-sparsity Unobservable Attack (UA) cases [21] , labelled as 3-sparse UA case and 5-sparse UA case. In the IEEE 14-bus system, the attack meter sets S 8 = {T 8 , U 8 } and S 1 = {T 1 , U 1 } are selected as the 3-and 5-sparse UA cases, respectively, where T 8 = {7, 8}, U 8 = {28}, T 1 = {1, 2, 5} and U 1 = {15, 16}. In the IEEE 30-bus system, the attack meter sets S 13 = {T 13 , U 13 } and S 23 = {T 23 , U 23 } are selected as the 3-and 5-sparse UA cases, respectively, where T 13 = {12, 13}, U 13 = {46}, T 23 = {15, 23, 24} and U 23 = {60, 62}. The attack meter sets also can be found in the Fig.2 . In the first stage of the proposed attack scheme, the Matlab M-files of the N-way tensor toolbox is utilized to estimate the incomplete system matrix [34] , [35] . In the second stage of the proposed attack scheme, the parameter p in the p relaxation approach is set as 0.8 [30] . Moreover, the proposed algorithm, labelled as the PARAFAC-based method, will be compared with the existing algorithm [14] ; and labelled as the ICA-based method. We first evaluated the Mean Square Errors (MSEs) of the system matrix identification. The required estimated subsystem matrices are selected as G(E i , :), where i = 8, 1 of the IEEE-14 system cases, and i = 13, 23 of the IEEE-30 system cases, respectively. Usually, the number of meter set E i is suggested to select larger than the number of loads to ensure the sparsity of constructed attack vector, e.g., |E i | = 2n d . The MSEs are defined as the residual error between the meter measurements and the estimated values. Based the relationship betweenĜ(E i , :) and G(E i , :) by applying (21) , the MSEs can be calculated by E( z( Fig.3 (a) and (b) show the MSEs comparison of the PARAFAC method and the ICA method under various SNRs noises and various intercepted meter numbers, respectively. In Fig.3 (a) , the PARAFAC method achieves a lower MSEs performance than that of the ICA method, especially in the lower SNRs cases. That is, the PARAFAC algorithm exploits the higher-order statistics of the non-Gaussian load variables to identify the system matrix. Hence, the PARAFAC method is less sensitive to the system's Gaussian noises than that of the ICA method. In addition, we test the robustness of the provided methods with various numbers of intercepted meters under 10 dB noise and 30 dB noise levels, respectively. In Fig.3(b) , it can be observed a stable MSEs performance with the proposed method can be achieved when the number of intercepted meters reaches up to 25. This result suggests that the number of intercepted meters should be selected at least as the number of loads to achieve a better MSEs performance. Still, the PRRAFACbased method can achieve lower MSEs than that of the ICA-based method. Using the estimated system matrix, we next evaluated the attack vector construction performance. Since the attack vector constructed by the ICA-based method has no sparse terms, we consider only the sparse attack vector construction with the proposed p relaxation method. Fig.4 illustrate the attack vector construction using the estimated system matrix and the perfect system matrix under the IEEE 14-bus case and the IEEE 30-bus case, respectively. These results show that the attack vector based on the estimated system matrix has constructed almost identically to the one based on the perfect system matrix. In other words, the attack vectors can be confidently constructed with low-level sparse terms by the proposed method. Thus, the impact of the estimation system matrix error on the sparse attack vector construction can be acceptable for the most cases.
Finally, we evaluated the attack performance of the proposed attack scheme by the Missed Detection Probability (MDP) [14] . Let M be the total numbers of Monte Carlo runs, e.g., 1000, and let M 0 be the number of missed detection of the attack case. Thus, the MDP can be calculated by M 0 /M %. Furthermore, the MDP under the no attack case is used as a baseline of the attack case. For every Monte Carlo run, the BDD method is used to identify the missed detection events. A missed detection occurs if max j (|r j |/ cov(r j ) ) ≤ τ by applying (4), where τ is a pre-set threshold varied from 0.1 to 1. To illustrate the minimal attack meter sets provided in the Theorem 4, we provide a comparison of the attack performance by assuming that the minimal attack meters cannot be available. For example, we randomly delete one meter from the proposed attack meter sets of S 8 , S 13 , S 1 and S 23 , respectively; and labeled them as 2-sparse UA case of the first two attack meter sets and 4-sparse UA case of the last two attack meter sets, respectively. Fig.5 illustrate that the MDP increases as the threshold increases in both the IEEE 14-and 30-bus cases. As shown in Fig.5 (a) , the curves of the proposed attack scheme are very close to the no-attack case both in the 3-and 5-sparse UA cases. Meanwhile, the MDP of both in the 2-and 4-sparse UA cases are relatively lower than the no attack case at the same threshold level. This observation shows that the proposed attack meter sets are the minimal number of the attack meters. Similar results can also be observed in Fig.5 (b) . Overall, it is hard to distinguish the attack case from the no attack case.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we theoretically proved that the smart grid can be attacked in the unobservable way even with an incomplete knowledge of the system matrix. We illustrated this result with a data-driven attack scheme for an attacker who has a limited access to the power facilities. Experimental results demonstrated that the provided attack scheme can successfully bypass the system detector with a low detection probability. Moreover, our results revealed the potential risk of data leakage to the security of the smart grid. In the future, it would be interesting to develop efficient methods to detect such attacks and investigate the corresponding defence strategies from the following aspects; first, the discussion on the unobservable attacks can be extended to the Alternating Current scenario where the power system is described as a nonlinear model, which would be more practical for the security of the smart grid; second, currently methods in wireless communication, such as physical layer security techniques, can be applied to the smart grid to enhance the transmission security of the meter data; third, some detection methods for searching the fragile meter sets are required by coordinating the meter data and the topology of the smart grid; finally, higher-level detection algorithms are required to exploit the sparsity feature of the attack vector. 
As the analytical solution of (A9) is difficult to obtain, we employ the method in [29] to iteratively find the feasible solution,
where ε is an introduced small positive regularization. 
